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Introduction
Since 9/11, the United States has expanded the number of programs aimed at curbing the number of undocumented immigrants by discouraging their entry and, more importantly, facilitating their apprehension and deportation. Altogether, the various programs have been With this study, we aim to assess how the escalation of immigration enforcement taking place at the local and state levels since the early 2000s has impacted the structure of the families to which 4.5 million American children with an undocumented parent belong. Our primary focus is on whether intensified enforcement has contributed to raising the prevalence of children living without their parents in households headed by relatives or friends. Because parental deportations are known to result in children being left behind with relatives or friends not at risk of removal (Capps et al. 2007) , gaining a better understanding of the extent to which the current piecemeal approach to immigration enforcement is impacting the likelihood of parentless children seems vital. In addition, given that many of those deported are married fathers whose spouses remain in the United States (Capps et al. 2016) , we subsequently zoom into, yet, another consequence of intensified enforcement -namely, its impact on the incidence of children living in female-headed households with an absentee spouse.
Understanding the consequences of intensified immigration enforcement on the family structure of American children with a likely undocumented parent is important for a number of reasons. First, the sheer size of this demographic makes this question extremely relevant.
These children represent approximately 8 percent of American children -twice as many as in 2002 (Passel et al. 2014) . In due course, they will become eligible voters and have a say on the nation's politics and immigration policy.
1, Secondly, the piecemeal approach to immigration enforcement is unlikely to change any time soon. On the contrary, immigration enforcement has intensified under the new Administration (Sacchetti 2017) . 2 Lastly, understanding how intensified immigration enforcement is affecting the family environment in which an estimated 4.5 million of American children grow up is vital given what we know about the importance of the family context early in life on numerous outcomes later on. An established literature on parental incarceration has found that the absence of a parent can strain important protective factors, such as parental involvement, and create risk factors, such as financial hardship (Murray et al. 2012) . Children growing up in single-parent households or without parents are more likely to drop out the school, experience teen-age pregnancies, and have lower earnings in the future (see for example, McLanahan 2004; Adda et al. 2011) . Thus, gaining a better understanding of the impacts of intensified immigration enforcement on the families in which they grow up is well warranted.
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We rely on a unique data set that combines data from the American Community Survey 2 See, for example: https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration-arrests-up-duringtrump/2017/05/17/74399a04-3b12-11e7-9e48-c4f199710b69_story.html 3 The budget for immigration enforcement planned for 2018, it is a 25 percent more than previous year. 4 Between January 22 and April 29, ICE conducted around 10,800 "non-criminal arrests," compared to just 4,200 in 2016-an increase of more than 150 percent(U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 2017a).
undocumented status of parents using traits found to be good predictors of such a status. The latter include being a non-citizen, low skilled (to exclude foreign-born students or high-skilled non-immigrant visa holders) and a long-term (five plus years to exclude non-immigrant visa holders) Hispanic resident. To have a similar sample of treated and control youth (namely, children with a likely undocumented parent and children without), we focus on Hispanic children ages 0-15 residing in households headed by low-skilled individuals with less than a high school education, and long-term U.S. residents with 5 or more years in the country.
In order to identify the effect of intensified enforcement on children's living arrangements, we exploit the temporal and geographic variation of interior immigration policies. We find that the average increase in immigration enforcement during the [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] period raises the children's likelihood to reside without any of their parents in households headed by naturalized relatives or friends by 19 percent -a result pointing to both parents' intent to leave the children at the care of a relative or friend unthreatened by deportation.
Likewise, the same increase in immigration enforcement raises these children's propensity to live in households headed by a likely undocumented mother with an absentee spouse by 20 percent -a finding that supports statistics showing that most children with a likely undocumented father have undocumented mothers, as we shall show. Finally, we are able to confirm that the impacts emanate from police-based immigration enforcement policies directly associated to deportations, as opposed to employment verification mandates that could also influence the household structure through work and financial constraints. The findings prove robust to a number of identification and falsification checks.
This research contributes to a rapidly growing literature concerned with the consequences of a fragmented approach to immigration enforcement. lacking. In addition, by examining the impact of immigration policies on the families to which 4.5 million children reside, we also contribute to the literature examining the impact of policies on family structure (e.g. Bitler et al. 2006) .
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the expected effect of immigration enforcement on children's living arrangements based on the existing literature. We describe the data in Section 3, and our empirical methodology in Section 4. We present and discuss our main findings and robustness checks in Section 5, and assess our identification strategy in Section 6. In Section 7, we look closer at the channels through which the observed impacts seem to be taking place, and Section 8 concludes the study.
Immigration Enforcement and Household Composition
Since 9/11, the United States has witnessed an unprecedented increase in spending on immigration enforcement, which more than quadrupled during that period of time (see Figure   A1 ). In response to the failure by Congress to pass a comprehensive immigration reform, states and localities started to take immigration matters into their own hands. A plethora of initiatives and programs followed, some focused on verifying work eligibility -as in the case of employment verification or E-Verify mandates, 6 and others effectively delegating immigration enforcement on local and state police -as in the case of 287(g) agreements between law enforcement and Immigration Customs Enforcement, or its successor: the Secure Communities 5 Capps et al. (2007) use a small survey on children whose parents were arrested in three worksite raids to provide some descriptive evidence of how deportation of a parent can result in children being left behind in the care of a single parent, an older sibling, or other relative. 6 We include employment verification mandates in our analysis since they could impact family composition by placing financial constraints on the household. We focus on how the intensification of immigration enforcement has led to changes in family structure frequently stemming from deportations, most of them involving fathers and heads of household (Capps et al. 2016) . Deportations often result in single-headed households struggling to make ends meet (Dreby 2012) , abandoned children and, overall, ripped apart families. Specifically, prior reports discuss how children are often left back in the United States residing in a singly headed household with their mother (often an undocumented immigrant like their deported father) or, if both parents are deported or leave the country, with relatives and friends not at risk of deportation (Capps et al. 2007) . Not surprisingly, the children belonging to such households often find themselves overburdened with adult responsibilities that interfere with their schooling progression (Menjivar 2006 ) and adversely impact their health and future employment outcomes (Brooks-Gunn et al. 1997; Brabeck and Qingwen Xu 2010; Hagan et al. 2010; Delva et al. 2013) . Given the emotional, cognitive and long-run socioeconomic costs of being raised in a single-headed household (Amato 2005; Chaudry et al. 2010) , gaining a better understanding of the collateral damage of heightened enforcement on the families to which these children belong is warranted.
7 See Appendix Table B1 for a description of each policy.
Data Sources and Samples
We use various sources of data in our analysis: (1) the American Community Survey (ACS) provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 2015) , and (2) local and state-level data on the enactment and implementation dates of a number of interior immigration enforcement initiatives, including: 287(g) agreements, Secure Communities, employment verification mandates and omnibus immigration laws.
The American Community Survey
The American Community Survey ( Finally, because of its sampling and interview process, the ACS is particularly appropriate to study this population. It conducts interviews without regard to legal status, using the near universe of U.S. addresses to derive its interview sample. Figure A3 ).
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10 The Census Bureau and the Department of Homeland Security estimate that nearly 40 percent of non-citizens are authorized immigrants (Acosta et al. 2014; Baker and Rytin 2013 Hook et al. 2015) , as it is the intent of the present study.
Our interest is in examining the implications of intensified immigration enforcement on the structure of families to which American children with a likely undocumented parent belong by looking at the incidence of two events: (1) their propensity to reside without their parents in a household headed by relatives or friends, and (2) their likelihood of residing in a singly headed household with mothers who report having an absentee spouse. We focus on U.S.-born children 15 years old and younger to avoid including potential teen parents as children. To have a sample of children that are comparable to those with a likely undocumented parent, we make children living in households headed by naturalized and U.S.-born Hispanics with less than a high school diploma our control group. In that manner, we retain a sample of children who are alike in the sense they all live in households headed by low skilled and longterm Hispanic residents. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for our samples of children. Specifically, Panel
A of Table 1 informs on the sample of children used to gauge the impact of intensified immigration enforcement on their likelihood to reside without any parents in a household headed by a relative or friend. Approximately 7.6 percent of these children reside in households headed by likely undocumented individuals, 9.5 percent reside in households headed by naturalized immigrants, and 18 percent live in household headed by natives.
Children are, on average, 7 years old.
In Panel B of Table 1 , we display the descriptive statistics for a subsample of children with married mothers for whom the ACS gathers information on the absentee status of the spouse. Approximately 3.3 percent report living in a household headed by a likely undocumented mom whose spouse is absent. The share living in a household headed by a naturalized mom whose spouse is reported as absent is 5.2 percent, and the share living in a household headed by a native mom with an absentee spouse is 10.5 percent. The children are, on average, closet to 8 years old.
Given our focus on children residing in households headed by low skilled and longterm residents in both Panels A and B, it is not surprising to find that household heads have, on average, close to 7 years of education and have resided in the country for approximately 16 years. Finally, Table 1 
Enforcement Data
In order to exploit the geographic and temporal variation in the adoption of various immigration enforcement initiatives, we gather historical and current data. Specifically, data on the implementation of 287(g) agreements at the state level is gathered for the 2005 through 2015 period from the ICEs 287(g) Fact Sheet website, Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2014),
and Kostandini et al. (2013) . Since the ICE website contains only a list of the current active agreements, we review old websites and prior research using these agreements to ensemble a Our purpose is to gauge how tougher enforcement might break up families of American children with likely undocumented parents through the deportation of mainly fathers; thus raising these children's likelihood of: (1) living without their parents in households headed by relatives or friends, or (2) living in female-headed households with an absentee spouse. From the onset, it is worth noting that one can only proxy for the intensity of immigration enforcement. After all, even the same 287(g) agreement can be applied more or less strictly in distinct locations depending on the local police authorities in charge of its implementation. In addition, since the geographic scope of many of the aforementioned enforcement initiatives is the county, it might be the case that one policy is activated in only one county in the MSA, but not in others. In those instances, some families within that MSA are covered by the measure, whereas others are not. To proxy for the enforcement intensity to which an individual living in MSA m in year t might be exposed to, we calculate the following population-weighted index for each enforcement initiative k:
where � , � is an indicator function that informs about the implementation of a particular policy in county a at time (month) t. Note that the above index takes into account: (1) the number of months during which a particular policy has been in place in any given year, as well as (2) the population of the counties in question. Specifically, the summation over the 12 months in the year captures the share of months during which the measure was in place in any given year. To weigh it population-wise, we use the term: ,2000 -namely, the population of county a according to the 2000 Census (prior to the rolling of any of the enforcement initiatives being considered), and N -the total population in MSA m.
Hence, the overall enforcement to which children living in local area m and time (now: year) t are exposed to is computed as the sum of the indices for each enforcement initiative at the (MSA, year) level:
As shown in Table 1 , the immigration enforcement index, which varies between 0 and 5, averaged between 0.94 and 1 for the samples and time period under consideration.
14 Figure   A4 illustrates the growing funding of Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) -typically in charge of interior immigration enforcement. The temporal variation in interior immigration enforcement is also evident from the trends in the various immigration enforcement indexes we work with -all plotted in Figure A5 . In addition, Figure A6 shows the geographic variation 
Empirical Strategy
To gauge the effect of intensified immigration enforcement on the living arrangements of American children with a likely undocumented parent, we start by estimating the following 13 Where k refers to each policy, i.e.: 287(g) local, 287(g) state, secure communities, Omnibus immigration law and E-verify. 14 As we explain in what follows, we also experiment with alternative immigration enforcement indices to address the impact of various types of policies. Specifically, we distinguish between police-based policies (policies that require the immediate involvement of police officers) and employment-based policies (such as employment verification mandates that involve employers and are not directly linked to deportation orders). In addition, in separate analyses, we further construct indices that distinguish according to the scope (local vs. state-level) of the policies. Results corroborate those found using a single index.
benchmark model specification, which exploits the aforementioned temporal and geographic variation in the enforcement index, as follows:
where , , is our outcome variable -namely: the ith child's living arrangement in MSA m and year t. , is an index that serves as a proxy for the intensity of enforcement to which the child is exposed to. X' is a vector of demographic characteristics, including controls for the child's age and its squared term, as well as the household head's years of education and length of U.S. residency, if foreign-born. 15 The vector Z contains information on the welfare generosity at the state level, which is known to affect child living arrangements (Bitler, et al. 2006) . 16 Finally, equation (3) includes temporal and geographic fixed-effects (i.e. dummies for each year and MSA), as well as MSA-specific time trends to capture other unobserved fixed and time-varying traits potentially affecting our outcomes that we might fail to account for. Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.
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The coefficient of interest is 1 , which captures the relationship between the intensity of local and state-level immigration enforcement and our outcome variables. A positive coefficient would be consistent with our prediction that tougher enforcement increases the incidence of: (1) children living without parents, and (2) children living in singly headed households with mothers who report having an absentee spouse following the breaking up of the family unit through parental deportations. 15 In the case of natives, this term equals their age. 16 Additionally, in an intermediate model specification (shown as specification 3 in Tables 2-4) , we experiment with controlling for potentially endogenous MSA characteristics. We do this by adding as controls pretreatment MSAs characteristics (all measured in the year 2000, thus prior to the implementation of any of the immigration enforcement measures at hand), all of which are interacted with a time trend, e.g. ( ′ ,2000 * ) .
The vector: ,2000 includes the unemployment rate and the share of Hispanics in the MSA, as well as the share of people voting republican in the state. By interacting those MSA traits with a time trend, we allow for their variation over time. The vector ( ′ ,2000 * ) later on drops from specification (4) as it is collinear with MSA-specific time trends. 17 Table B2 in the appendix describes the variables used in the analysis.
5.
Intensified Immigration Enforcement and Children's Living Arrangements
Main Findings
As noted earlier, our main aim is to assess how the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement at the local and state levels has influenced the structure of families to which 4.5 million of U.S.-born children with an undocumented parent belong. To that end, Table 2 reports on our main outcome of interest -namely, the impact that intensified immigration enforcement is having on the children's likelihood of living without their parents in households headed by relatives or friends. We distinguish according to whether the household head is a likely undocumented immigrant, a naturalized immigrant or a U.S. native since parents might prefer leaving their children in a household unthreatened by further deportations (Capps et al. 2007 ). As noted earlier, equation (3) is estimated on a sample of U.S.-born children in households headed by low skilled and long-term Hispanic residents using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). We estimate a number of specifications that progressively add controls to assess the robustness of our findings to the estimation of more comprehensive models.
Focusing on the most complete model specification, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the enforcement index (equal to the average level of immigration enforcement for the period under consideration) raises the children's propensity to reside without their parents in a household headed by naturalized relatives or friends by 18.8 percent.
However, immigration enforcement does not appear to raise these children's propensity to reside without their parents in a household headed by a likely undocumented or a native relative or friend. Overall, the results suggest that, perhaps, when deported, parents leave their offspring in households headed by other immigrants who are, nonetheless, naturalized and, as such, not at risk of deportation.
Since most deportees are men, many of them fathers, Table 3 further looks at the impact of intensified immigration enforcement on the children's propensity to reside in households singly headed by their mothers with absentee husbands. Because the ACS only gathers information on the absentee status of spouses, the sample used to learn about this outcome is somewhat smaller. We continue to distinguish children according to the likely immigration status of the household head since. As shown in Table C in the appendix, the majority of children with a likely undocumented parent have parents who are both likely undocumented.
Hence, immigration enforcement should particularly raise the likelihood that children with a likely undocumented parent might reside in households singly headed by their likely undocumented mothers.
As in Table 2 , we estimate a number of specifications that progressively add controls to assess the robustness of our findings. Focusing, once more, on the most complete model specifications, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the enforcement index increases the children's likelihood of living in households singly headed by their likely undocumented mothers with absentee spouses by 20 percent. 18 However, it does not appear to raise their propensity to reside in households singly headed by naturalized or U.S.-born mothers with absent spouses -a smaller share of whom are likely married to unauthorized men. Indeed, these results are easily understood in light of the fact that most undocumented fathers are married to likely undocumented women (see Table C in the appendix). Through the deportation of fathers, intensified immigration enforcement ends up primarily splitting households where both parents are likely undocumented, leaving the mother alone to take care of their U.S.-born offspring.
Robustness Checks
Much of the intensification of immigration enforcement coincided with the onset of the Great Recession. As such, one might be concerned that the estimated impact of intensified 18 The standard deviation of the enforcement index is 0.94 and, on average, 3. Table 4 displays the results from estimating these children's propensity to reside without any of the parents in a household headed by a relative or friend, as well as their likelihood to live in a female-headed household with an absentee spouse. As we would expect, immigration enforcement does not appear to have had an impact on any of the aforementioned events despite the fact that white non-Hispanic children residing in household with low-skilled heads were also severely hit by the economic downturn.
Subsequently, we explore the possibility that our findings might be driven by the harsher implementation of immigration enforcement by some counties. Of particular note in the literature is the case of Maricopa County in Arizona. Sheriff Joe Arpaio has been an extreme advocate of tough immigration enforcement, labelling himself as "America's
Toughest Sheriff" (Janofsky 2002). Hence, in Table 5 , we re-estimate our models excluding Maricopa County. As can be seen from our estimates in that table, our findings prove robust to the exclusion of that outlier.
19 Approximately 50 percent of black children under 18 live in households singly headed by their mothers, versus close to 30 percent of Hispanic children and about 20 percent of white children. See: https://www.census.gov/hhes/families/files/graphics/CH-2-3-4.pdf.
Identification
Thus far, we have shown how the intensification of immigration enforcement can raise the propensity of Hispanic U.S.-born children to reside: (1) without any parent in a household headed by naturalized relatives or friends, or (2) in a household headed by a likely undocumented mother who is singly heading the household in the absence of her spouse. We have also shown how these findings are unique to children with a likely undocumented parent, as opposed to non-Hispanic white children, and how they are not driven by the particularly tough position on immigration enforcement adopted by Maricopa County in Arizona. The validity of our identification approach and findings relies on a number of assumptions we address in what follows.
Parallel Trends Assumption
A first assumption is that the measured impact of intensified enforcement did not predate the implementation of tougher enforcement itself. To assess whether that was the case, we estimate equation ( Table 2 , Panel B, and Table 3 , Panel A.
The Endogenous Adoption of Immigration Enforcement
A second concern in any policy assessment refers to the potential endogeneity of the policy itself. While understandably not random, the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement needs to be non-endogenous to our outcome of interest -in our case, the family arrangements of children in our samples. One way to assess if that is a reasonable assumption is to examine if the adoption timing at each MSA is correlated to the incidence of the living arrangements we are interested in prior to the adoption of any enforcement. To that end, we aggregate the data at the MSA level and estimate the following regression: The results from both of these exercises are displayed in Table 7 . Regardless of the outcome in question, we find that none of the incidence rates of the two children's living arrangements at the MSA level prior to the adoption of stricter enforcement measures seems to have played a significant role in the adoption timing by the MSA or on the initial level of immigration enforcement at the MSA. As such, while not random, the timing of adoption of tougher immigration enforcement or the initial level of immigration enforcement do not appear to be explained by changes in the outcomes of interest to us in this study.
The Non-random Location of Immigrants
A last challenge when assessing the impacts of any policy on immigrant families is the non-random residential location of immigrants themselves. This is particularly true when examining the living arrangements of children with likely undocumented parents. After all, unauthorized migrants might respond to intensified enforcement by moving to safer areas with less enforcement. In that case, we might not find a significant impact of tougher enforcement on the living arrangements of children in our sample. In other words, our estimates might be downward biased. Subsequently, we interact the share in equation (6) with the shift -namely, the level of immigration enforcement for each MSA in question in any given year. For this instrument to be valid, it needs to be highly correlated to the non-instrumented exposure to tougher 21 We are using the population in 2000 given that we cannot consistently identify MSAs in 1980 or 1990 with those in 2000 onwards.
immigration enforcement, which, as we shall show, it is due to the entrenched tendency for immigrants to locate in areas with established networks of their compatriots (Bartel 1989; Card 2001; Cortes and Tessada 2011, among many others) . Table 8 shows the IV estimates for both outcomes. When examining our first outcome, we focus our attention on mixed-status households since they are the ones most likely to have made residential decisions based on intensified immigration enforcement. The sample for the second outcome is the same as in Table 3 Table 3 . While the IV estimates are, certainly, more imprecisely estimated, they serve to confirm that, if anything, our OLS estimates are probably lower bound estimates of the true impact of intensified enforcement.
Mechanisms at Work
We have so far documented how the intensification of immigration enforcement appears to raise the propensity of two types of living arrangements among American children with a likely undocumented parent: (1) living without any parent in households headed by naturalized relatives or friends, and (2) living in households singly headed by likely undocumented mothers with absentee spouses. The rationale behind these findings, which appear to be unique to children with a likely undocumented parent, not solely driven by
Maricopa County and survive a number of identification checks, is that via the deportation of family members, intensified immigration enforcement splits the families of these children.
To assess if enforcement is driving our findings, we first experiment with excluding states that have passed a Trust Act. Trust Acts are adopted with the purpose of increasing trust and community cooperation with the police following the prior implementation of programs, such as 287(g) agreements, increasing information sharing between local, state, and federal government agencies (Skogan and Frydl 2004; Fagan and Meares 2008; Fagan and Tyler 2008; Tyler 2010) . We exclude states with Trust Acts to more accurately capture the impact of intensified immigration enforcement, which should be lax or close to null in those areas. The results in Table 9 suggest that a one standard deviation increase in immigration enforcement raises the children's likelihood of residing without their parents in a household headed by a naturalized relative or friend by 22 percent. Likewise, the same increase in immigration enforcement raises the children's likelihood of residing in households singly headed by their likely undocumented mothers with absentee spouses by 17 percent. Both impacts are not statistically different from the estimated impacts in Tables 2, Panel B, and Table 3 , Panel A, suggesting that the impacts being measured therein are indeed originating from states without a Trust Act.
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To further assess if the observed impacts are likely occurring through the splitting of households that follows the deportation of a parent, we distinguish between two types of measures: (1) employment-based enforcement, and (2) police-based enforcement. The former 22 We also perform the analysis for states with a Trust Act and are unable to find a statistically significant impact of immigration enforcement in those instances.
consist of employment verification mandates checking the work eligibility of immigrants. The latter involve the local and state police and are directly linked to the apprehension and deportation of undocumented immigrants. If the measured impacts of intensified enforcement in Table 2, Panel B, and Table 3 , Panel A, were indeed capturing the impact of deportations, we would only expect police-based enforcement, which is responsible for deportations from the interior, to have a significant impact on the living arrangements of children. Table 10 displays the estimates from this additional robustness check. As we would expect, a one standard deviation increase in police-based immigration enforcement raises the children's likelihood of residing without their parents in a household headed by a naturalized relative or friend by 19 percent. Likewise, the same increase in police-based immigration enforcement raises the children's likelihood of residing in households singly headed by likely undocumented mothers with absent spouses by 38 percent. However, employment-based measures, which could indirectly impact family composition by placing severe financial constraints on the household, do not seem to have a statically significant impact on the children's living arrangements.
Summary and Conclusions
Since 9/11, we have witnessed an unprecedented escalation of interior immigration enforcement that led to unparalleled increases in deportation figures -the vast majority of men, many of whom were fathers of U.S.-born children. In this paper, we gauge the impact that the escalation of immigration enforcement is having on the structure of families to which 4.5 million American children with an undocumented parent belong by raising the prevalence of two specific types of arrangements: (1) living without parents, and (2) living in households singly headed by likely undocumented mothers with absent spouses.
We find that the piecemeal approach to immigration enforcement has raised the exposure of these children to living without any of their parents in a household headed by a Notes: Sample: U.S.-born children ages 0-15 residing in households headed by a low skilled (with less than a high school diploma) and long-term Hispanic resident (with 5+ years of residency in the United States). In Panel B, the sample is further restricted to married household heads who report on the absentee status of their partners. (3) in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the MSA level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Notes: Sample: U.S.-born children ages 0-15 residing in households headed by a low skilled (with less than a high school diploma) and long-term Hispanic resident (with 5+ years of residency in the United States), excluding states with a Trust Act (see: http://www.catrustact.org/text-of-trust-acts.html) . In Panel B, the sample is further restricted to married household heads who report on the absentee status of their partners. Model specifications: All model specifications include a constant term. In addition, specification (1) includes individual characteristics. Specification (2) includes area and time fixed effects and other state welfare programs. Specification (3) adds aggregate MSA-time controls, and Specification (4) further adds the MSA-specific time trend as in equation (3) Sample: U.S.-born children ages 0-15 residing in households headed by a low skilled (with less than a high school diploma) and long-term Hispanic resident (with 5+ years of residency in the United States).
